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1 Introduction 
Recently, there have been many studies focusing on the reformation of personnel systems. In 
Japan, the transformation to performance-based systems has been an important issue. However, to 
increase the efficiency of personnel management, it is inappropriate to focus only on the reform of 
the personnel system. It is also necessary to focus on “boss effects,” because supervisors including 
managers play an important role in personnel management.  
Do bosses have a positive impact on their subordinates’ performance in Japanese companies? 
Bosses who perform well in their own jobs will not necessarily improve their subordinates’ 
performance. It is considered inefficient if bosses have no impact on their subordinates’ performance, 
in which case the allocation of managers is irrelevant. It is worthwhile to focus on boss effects if 
managers have the potential to significantly improve their subordinates’ performance. However, little 
consideration has been given to research on boss effects to date.  
There is a considerable amount of literature discussing the impacts of managers or CEOs on 
corporate behaviour. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) examine manager effects on corporate behaviour in 
terms of different decision-making behaviours. Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012) examine the 
particular characteristics of CEOs that are important for corporate governance. Bennedsen (2007) 
assesses CEO effects on firm outputs. However, most of these studies do not consider the effects of 
bosses on their workers. Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (2012) use a boss–worker matched dataset to 
study boss effects in technology-based jobs, but they do not examine boss effects in white-collar 
occupations. 
The first objective of this study is to investigate whether boss effects exist in both white-collar and 
blue-collar occupations using a boss–worker matched dataset from a Japanese manufacturing 
company (hereafter Company Z). In most of manufacturing companies in Japan, permanent 
employees in a blue-collar occupation are commonly evaluated based on their performance and are 
subject to the same seniority-based pay system as white-collar workers1. It is suggested that there 
may be significant boss effects in Company Z. Furthermore, it seems that the boss effects only 
become apparent 1 year later (i.e., there is a 1-year lag), and do not disappear immediately when 
subordinates switch bosses. The second objective is to examine the heterogeneity and trends of boss 
effects. The analysis in this paper indicates that bosses affect their subordinates heterogeneously due 
to their personal management styles. Therefore, boss effects will become increasingly significant 
over time. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Several previous studies on boss effects are 
                                                 
1 Koike (1996) found “the white collarization of blue-collar workers” by focusing on intellectual mastery and kaizen 
(the concept of continuous improvement in the front-lines of manufacturing processes) among blue-collar workers in 
large Japanese manufacturing companies. Ishida (1990) studied the distribution of pay levels in blue-collar jobs in 
Japanese manufacturing companies and concluded that this was both an incentive and a source of management 
control in the manufacturing process. 
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introduced in Section 2. The empirical method used to investigate boss effects in this paper is 
explained in Section 3. The background of the dataset, and descriptions of the key variables, 
including evaluation outcomes, are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and 
discussion. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2  Literature Review 
 
In the field of business management, the role of managers or supervisors and the performance of 
teams have long been debated in leadership theory. Starting with the Ohio study in the late 1940s, 
contingency theory and path–goal theory sought to shed light on the relationships between 
leadership qualities, behaviour, and circumstances2. However, these fundamentals of leadership 
theory have subsequently been extended in numerous ways, and discussion has focused on the 
changing attitudes of subordinates. In the fields of psychology and organizational behaviour in 
business management, the subject of supervisory coaching behaviour has been discussed. Although 
little empirical research measuring leaders’ behaviour and employees’ performance exists, Ellinger, 
Ellinger, and Keller (2003) examined the links between supervisory coaching behaviour and 
employee job satisfaction and performance. 
Because “firms and employees naturally have opposing interests in that employee effort typically 
leads to benefits to the firms and costs to the employee” (Lazear and Oyer, 2013, p. 480), incentives, 
monitoring, and intrinsic rewards are central issues in personnel economics. Since Becker proposed 
the idea of human capital in 1964, Lazear (1979) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) have gone on to 
discuss contract theory, describing the need for purposeful design of compensation and performance 
systems. The evaluation system is one aspect of employee monitoring, and is usually administered 
by managers or supervisors. Moreover, in a well-designed incentive scheme, it is the role of the CEO 
or managers to encourage actions that lead to goal congruence, and they can avoid conflicts of 
interest by modifying self-interested behaviour on the part of employees. 
Most recently, economists have used empirical studies to explore the effects of incentives on 
employees in relatively controlled settings. Literature in various fields has examined work behaviour 
and workers’ productivity. Abowd, Kramarz, and Woodcock (2008) developed a method to analyse 
the relationship between the employer and the employees (job relationship) using prototypical 
longitudinally linked employer–employee data. First, they introduced two specifications for their 
linear regression model. One contained the interaction between observable and unobservable 
characteristics of the individuals and the firms. The other was simpler, only examining the pure 
person effects and pure firm effects. Their main interest was in person/firm effects and unobservable 
heterogeneity. In the second step, they focused on a mixed model specification of the pure person 
effects and pure firm effects models. Finally, they used the estimates of the fixed effects model as a 
base to investigate the heterogeneity biases in the case where the person effects or the firm effects 
                                                 
2 Fleishman and Harris (1962). 
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were omitted. They pointed out that the bias from omitting person/firm effects depended on the 
conditional covariance of the time-varying exogenous characteristics and the dummy variables for 
the firm/person effects, given the dummy variables for individuals/firms.  
Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (2012) used a similar methodology to investigate boss effects. They 
examined the supervisors’ impacts on the productivity of workers using a large sample of daily data 
from technology-based service jobs and found that high-quality bosses could increase teams’ outputs 
substantially. They also confirmed that the supervisors’ effects on workers’ outputs would persist, 
given that the bosses increased the workers’ productivity by teaching them new skills. Finally, 
Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton considered the efficient allocation of bosses. They found that by 
allocating effective bosses, high-quality workers’ productivity could be increased more than 
low-quality workers’ productivity. However, they did not investigate boss effects in white-collar 
occupations or their trends over time. 
  The recent studies in the field of education, the effect of principals offered insight for studies of 
“boss effects”. Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin (2012) provided quantitative evidence of the impact of 
school principals on student outcomes. They examined variations in the value added by principals by 
poverty quartile and found that the weakest principals were disproportionately distributed to the 
poorest schools. They investigated principal effectiveness and found that a high-quality principal 
could raise student outcomes above the annual average for all students in the school. They argued 
that principals influenced the students’ outcomes by the way in which they utilized the teaching staff.  
As noted, the relationship between principal quality and student outcomes in schools is similar to 
that between CEO quality and workers’ productivity. While Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin (2102) 
focused on the impact of principal quality, they did not consider the impacts of the teachers, who 
influenced the students directly. In other words, they did not examine the effects on workers’ outputs 
of their direct bosses.  
Rockoff (2004) investigated the extent to which teacher qualities influence students’ achievement 
using a student–teacher matched panel dataset. He used test scores for vocabulary, reading 
comprehension, mathematical computation, and mathematical concepts to measure student 
achievement. Rockoff used a random effects meta-analysis approach to confirm the existence of 
teacher effects. The results of F-tests indicated that teacher effects were significant determinants of 
students’ test scores. Rockoff calculated both the raw standard deviation and the estimated 
underlying standard deviation of teacher fixed effects. Although the adjusted standard deviation was 
lower than the raw one, it suggested that teacher qualities affected students’ achievement 
substantially. Furthermore, Rockoff proposed a correlation between teaching experience and student 
achievement. He assumed that the teachers’ years of experience would have no impact on students’ 
test scores when they exceeded a certain cutoff point. Strong evidence of gains from teaching 
experience was found in relation to vocabulary after controlling for teachers’ fixed effects. The 
marginal return of teaching experience was positive, but gradually declined as the years of 
experience increased until reaching the cutoff point. 
The application of an econometric methodology to analyse the relationship between a pair of 
actors is not confined to the field of education. It can also be applied to the field of sports to analyse 
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coaches’ effects on players’ performance. The first study to provide empirical evidence of the 
robustness of estimates of coaching efficiency using English Football Association data was 
conducted by Dawson, Dobson, and Gerrard (2000), who used match outcomes to measure team 
performance. Dawson, Dobson, and Gerrard used transfer values as the index of players’ talent. They 
utilized the players’ characteristics, including coaching input, to estimate values so that the indirect 
impacts of coaching could be captured. They found that estimates of coaching efficiency were 
sensitive to the choice of time-invariant efficiency models versus time-varying and inefficiency 
effect models. The results were also sensitive to the inclusion of ex post financial input, namely 
wage expenditure. Nevertheless, Dawson, Dobson, and Gerrard did not check for impacts on 
individual team members.  
Researchers tend to investigate the factors leading to differences in boss effects after confirming 
their existence, and there is a wide range of studies analysing management styles. Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003) constructed a panel dataset that matched managers and firms so that they were able to 
track the managers when they changed firms over time. This dataset was used to investigate whether 
and how managers influenced corporate decision-making processes. They found considerable 
heterogeneity among managers. Bertrand and Schoar examined manager fixed effects while 
controlling for firm fixed effects. Using F-tests for manager fixed effects, they found that the 
managers had a significant effect on a wide range of corporate decisions, including investment and 
acquisition decisions. They also utilized the size distribution to compare the magnitude of manager 
fixed effects and showed that some managers had a significant impact on corporate performance. In 
addition, they analysed the relationship between managerial styles and observable managerial 
characteristics, MBA graduation, and birth cohort. It was suggested that managers from earlier birth 
cohorts were more conservative financially. Nonetheless, managers who had graduated from MBA 
programs would make more aggressive decisions on average. Although Bertrand and Schoar 
confirmed the manager effect on corporate decision-making, they did not deal with the impacts on 
workers of different management styles. 
Borghans, Weel, and Weinberg (2008) considered a framework of interpersonal skills including 
caring and directness. Their analysis used a longitudinal dataset to examine the impact of individuals’ 
sociability in their youth on their job choices in later years. Their results showed that those who were 
sociable when they were 16 years old tended to choose jobs emphasizing interpersonal interactions. 
Borghans, Weel, and Weinberg investigated the relationship between interpersonal style and labour 
market consequences using British and German data. They found that directness provided higher 
returns than caring in terms of wages earned in both countries. They also found that workers were 
most productive when they were assigned to jobs that best matched their interpersonal styles. 
Although Borghans, Weel, and Weinberg examined workers’ wage premiums as a result of their 
interpersonal styles, they did not investigate the relationship between workers’ productivity and their 
bosses’ personal management styles. 
 
3  Framework of Analysis 
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Here, empirical models are developed to investigate whether boss effects exist in Company Z. The 
main models used in this paper are ordered probit models, which analyse the pooled data, and panel 
ordered probit models, which control for personal effects. Using time-series data, panel estimation 
eliminates both negative correlation and spurious correlation. It is possible to hypothesize individual 
personal effects, which are normally unobservable. As the goal of this study was to prove the 
existence of boss effects on subordinates’ performance, the dependent variable was the evaluation 
outcome, which represented the level of employee performance. In addition, the independent 
variable included dummy variables for the supervisors who evaluated their subordinates’ 
performance, and we hypothesized the existence and heterogeneity of boss effects in each evaluator. 
Because working with high-performing colleagues tends to improve the performance of 
lower-performing employees, the peer effect was also included as an independent variable. 
 
3.1  Ordered Probit Model 
The evaluation outcome is not a continuous variable, but rather a discrete variable, ranked from 1 
to 5 in ascending order of employee performance. Therefore, first, the changes in the possibility of 
being rated more highly are examined using pooled data via an ordered probit model. The 
performance of each worker is assumed to be a continuous latent variable y*, which is unobservable 
and specified as follows: yi∗ = Xiζ + WEiη + BOSSiθ+εi,                   (1) 
where yi∗ stands for the performance of worker i=1,…,N, and Xi is a vector of exogenous 
personal characteristics for worker i including age, gender, and years of schooling. To isolate boss 
effects from department effects, WEi is controlled for in the model. WEi describes the working 
environment of worker i, including the peer effects of his or her colleagues. BOSSi is a vector of 
indicator variables, regarded as boss effects for worker i. bossij, which is an element of BOSSii, is 1 
if the assessor of worker i is j (j=1,…,Z), and 0 otherwise. The error term ε
i
 has a standard normal 
distribution and are assumed to have the following properties: E�ε
i
�Xi, WEi, BOSSi� = 0, Cov�εm, εm�Xi, WEi, BOSSi� = �1 if m = n0 if m ≠ n.    (2) 
However, we can observe yi  instead of yi∗, where the evaluation outcome takes values of 1, 2, 
3, 4, or 5 according to the following rules, in which ki is the cutoff point: yi = 1 if and only if k0 < yi∗ ≤ k1 
⋮ yi = 5 if and only if k4 < yi∗ ≤ k5                 (3) 
Because the error terms are assumed to be independent and identically normally distributed 
according to Equation (2), the probability of being rated at the rth rank (r=1,…,5) is defined as 
follows: P(yi = r) = Φ�kr − Xiζ − WEiη − BOSSiθ� − Φ�kr−1 − Xiζ − WEiη − BOSSiθ�. (4) 
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Then, we can calculate the log-likelihood function using Equation (4), where dir = 1 if yi = r. 
Finally, the estimates of the parameters β, α, and γ can be calculated as follows: lnL(β,α, γ, k1, … , k4|yi, Xi, WEi, BOSSi) 
= � lnP(yi = r)N
i=1
 
= ∑ ∑ dir × ln [Φ�kr − Xiζ − WEiη − BOSSiθ� − Φ�kr−1 − Xiζ − WEiη − BOSSiθ�]5r=1Ni=1 . 
(5) 
 
3.2  Panel Ordered Probit Model 
Although an ordered probit model can provide evidence of boss effects using pooled data, it 
cannot control for personal effects such as initial ability. To control for personal effects, researchers 
(Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Lazear, Shaw and Stanton (2012)) tend to employ a fixed effects 
model. However, a fixed effects model does not fit discrete dependent variables. Hence, we 
introduce a panel ordered probit model, in which personal effects can be controlled for when the 
dependent variable is considered to be discrete. 
Similar to an ordered probit model, the performance of worker i in year t is considered to be a 
continuous latent variable, yit∗ , as follows: yijt∗ = Xijtζ + WEijtη + BOSSjtθ + ψi + υit,               (6) 
where i=1,…,N and t=2008,…,2013. The definitions of Xijt and WEijt are the same as those in 
the ordered probit model. bossijt, an element of BOSSjt, equals 1 if the assessor of worker i in year 
t is j (j=1,…,Z). ψi is defined as worker i’s random personal effect. υit refers to the error term. υit 
has a standard normal distribution and conforms to the following assumptions: 
E�υ
it
�X, WE, BOSS� = 0,Cov�υ
mt
, υ
nt
�X, WE, BOSS� = �1 if m = n0 if m ≠ n Cov�υ
it
, υ
is
�X, WE, BOSS� = �1 if t = s0 if t ≠ s and Cov(υit,  ψi|X, WE, BOSS) = 0.      (7) 
The observable discrete dependent variable yit is the evaluation outcome, which takes values of 
1 to 5 and follows similar rules to Equation (3). Compared with Equation (4), the possibilities of 
being rated at the rth rank after controlling for personal effects is defined as follows: P�yijt = r� = Φ�kr − Xijtζ − WEijtη − BOSSjtθ − ψi� − Φ�kr−1 − Xijtζ − WEijtη − BOSSjtθ − ψi�. 
(8) 
Based on Equation (8), we can obtain the following log-likelihood function for each worker i, 
i=1,…,N:  
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nL(ζ,η,θ, k1, … , k4) = ���dr(yit) × lnP�yijt = r��5
r=1
T
t=1
 
= ∑ ∑ {dr�yijt� × ln�Φ�kr − Xijtζ − WEijtη − BOSSjtθ − ψi�  −5r=1Tt=1
Φ�kr−1 − Xijtζ − WEijtη − BOSSjtθ − ψi��}. 
(9) 
In Equation (9), dr�yijt� equals 1 if the evaluation outcome of worker i in year t is r. The 
estimates can be obtained using the above equation. 
 
3.3  Likelihood-Ratio Test 
To investigate the existence and heterogeneity of boss effects, we employ the likelihood-ratio test 
after estimating the models as outlined above. The likelihood-ratio test utilizes the log-likelihoods of 
the unrestricted and restricted models to test whether the restricted model is justified. Setting θ1 as a 
base group for the boss dummy, the null hypothesis to test for heterogeneity in boss effects is defined 
as follows: H0: θ2 =θ3 = ⋯ =θZ . 
The test statistic of the likelihood-ratio test is LR = −2(lnLrestricted − lnLunrestricted), where lnLrestricted and lnLunrestricted are defined as 
the log-likelihood values of the restricted model and the unrestricted model, respectively. Under the 
null hypothesis, the test statistic LR will approximately follow the χ2  distribution with dfunrestricted − dfrestricted  degrees of freedom, where dfunrestricted  and dfrestricted  are the 
degrees of freedom of the models. 
 
4  Data 
 
4.1  Background of Company Z 
We use the boss–worker matched micro personnel dataset of Company Z from 2008 to 2013 so 
that we can analyse boss effects using information on both the bosses and their subordinates. 
Company Z is a regional Japanese consumer products company that has operated for nearly 100 
years. It has continuously expanded its scale, and its annual revenue rose from 36 billion yen in 2008 
to 51 billion yen in 2012. Currently, Company Z is one of the leading companies in its field, and 
supplies its products to customers throughout Japan. The number of regular employees in this 
company increased by 40% during the 5-year period 2008–2013, from 310 in 2008 to 440 in 2013. 
Company Z has a production division that contains employees about 20% to 40%3 of all regular 
                                                 
3 For the first 3 years, blue-collar employees represented about 20% of all regular employees. In 2011, when an 
additional factory was built, the number of blue-collar employees rose to nearly 40% of all regular employees. 
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employees. The ratio of blue-collar employees working on the production line, including the bottling 
process, accounts for approximately 30% of all regular employees over an entire period. Around 
25% of all regular employees belong to the sales division, approximately12% belong to the R&D 
division, including R&D and the quality assurance department, and around 10% belong to the 
planning (new business) division. Other minor divisions, namely, the administrative division and the 
food service division, comprise less than 5% of all employees each. 
The employees’ performance is used as the criterion for the evaluation of outcomes. The 
employees are rated on a scale of 1 to 5, which, in ascending order,  represent rankings of C (poor 
performance), B (not meeting requirements), AB (fulfilling requirements), A (above requirements), 
and S (outstanding performance), respectively. The ratings distribution within each department or 
division is never regulated. The assessors of the employees’ performance are their direct supervisors, 
because they train and supervise their subordinates. In this paper, the term “bosses” mentioned refers 
to these direct supervisors.  
The mechanism for evaluating the performance of employees is as follows. The evaluation system 
was comprised of two parts: behaviour evaluation and achievement evaluation. With regard to 
behaviour evaluation, specific behaviour-evaluation items were distilled based on competency, 
consistency, and conformity with the firm’s philosophy, management policy, and behavioural 
guidelines. Achievement evaluation was assessed based on performance in the management by 
objectives (MBO) system. The MBO system and operating rules were reformed to foster goal 
sharing among top-ranking managers and employees. Individual goals were linked to workplace 
goals, which were extensions of division or company goals. 
This evaluation system was introduced in April 2007 as a reform of the former system. At the 
same time, they introduced a reformed MBO system. The evaluation outcomes used in this study are 
all based on the reformed system. Company Z also tried to ensure the transparency of their new 
personnel system. Training for assessors under the new evaluation system was carried out every year 
after its launch. This training was aimed at deepening the understanding of the evaluation items in 
the new employee evaluation system, and consisted of lectures and practical training in the 
evaluation methods. The company gathered voice of employees through the CEO-members group 
interviews. 
 
4.2  Summary Statistics 
The dataset used in this study comprises 2263 observations of regular employees from 2008 to 
2013, including 1093 observations of employees whose bosses were different from the previous year. 
This dataset provides the foundation to analyse boss effects. 
First, the dependent variable needs to be considered. Here, the evaluation outcomes are used as the 
dependent variable. It is assumed that all workers are evaluated objectively based on the evaluation 
rules introduced above. Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (2012) used the outputs of technology-based 
service jobs as the dependent variable to measure productivity. However, this method was of limited 
value in blue-collar occupations. Hence, this study uses the evaluation outcomes as the dependent 
variable, so that productivity in white-collar occupations can also be measured.  
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In this micro personnel dataset, 2016 observations have evaluation outcomes. These outcomes are 
ranked from 1 to 5, where a rank of 5 refers to the best outcomes. As can be seen in Table 1, the 
mean evaluation outcome of employees is 3.76. This indicates that on average, both blue-collar and 
white-collar employees are rated at the 3rd rank (AB). This is further illustrated by the left-skewed 
distribution of evaluation outcomes shown in Figure 1. However the distribution of evaluation 
outcomes is varied in its shape, especially in year 2011, every distributions is still similar 
left-skewed as shown in Figure 2.   
(place Figure 1 here) 
(place Figure 2 here) 
 
Second, the list of personal characteristics can be seen in Table 1. The average age of the subjects 
in this study is about 33 years, and 26% are female. There is obvious polarization in employees’ 
educational backgrounds4. To enable quantitative control, educational background is translated into 
years of schooling, which is a continuous variable. As can be seen in Table 1, most of the employees 
have been educated for 14 years, which suggests attainment of either a high school or technical 
college diploma. This may be the result of the existence of large numbers of factory workers and 
senior employees who joined the company as blue-collar employees and rose to become managers5. 
Furthermore, peer effects are also controlled for as a characteristic of the working environment. Peer 
effects are calculated as the average evaluation outcomes of colleagues of the individuals concerned, 
and have a mean of 3.7. Because this study investigates lagged boss effects, the lagged 
characteristics are also controlled for in the analysis. 
During this analysis, considerable attention must be paid to the endogeneity problem. For example, 
better bosses may be assigned to supervise more workers and the time for teaching per subordinates 
gets lower, which would create a downward bias in the observed effect on subordinates’ performance. 
Alternatively, high-performing subordinates may be assigned to effective bosses, which would create 
an upward bias in the observed effect of subordinates’ performance.  
(place Table 1 here) 
 
5  Results 
 
5.1  Heterogeneity in Boss Effects 
The results shown in Table 2 indicate that bosses have an impact on their subordinates’ 
evaluations. Panel A shows the results for the ordered probit model using pooled data. Panel B shows 
                                                 
4 Educational attainment is classified into eight categories: secondary school, technical and vocational training 
school, high school, special vocational school, junior college, technical college, university, and postgraduate 
education (e.g., master’s degree and/or doctorate). 
5 Since Company Z is a typical Japanese manufacturing company, they provides a career path to the management 
level for high-performing blue-collar employees. 
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the results of the panel ordered probit model, which takes personal effects into account. The 
dependent variables of estimation in Table 2 are the same (i.e., the employees’ evaluation outcomes), 
taking values of 1–5. However, the independent variables that are controlled vary. Estimations A0 
and B0 control the boss dummies and peer effects of department in the year of the workers’ 
performances are evaluated. The boss dummies and peer effects that are controlled for in Estimations 
A1 and B1 and Estimations A2 and B2 are 1- and 2-year lagged, respectively. For example, in 
Estimations A0, A1, and A2, worker i’s boss dummies in 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively, are 
controlled for if the dependent variable takes the value of his or her evaluation outcome in 2010. 
The likelihood-ratio test is used to confirm the existence of boss effects and variations in boss 
effects among bosses. As can be seen in Table 2, the null hypothesis that boss effects do not differ 
from boss to boss is rejected at the 5% significance level in Estimations A1, A2, B1, and B2. These 
results illustrate that 1- and 2-year lagged boss effects both vary significantly from boss to boss 
when previous working environment characteristics are controlled for, regardless of whether 
individual effects are controlled for or not. It is therefore suggested that time-lagged boss effects 
exist in Company Z.  
The results indicate that bosses who have supervised them previously have an impact on workers’ 
current performance. In other words, boss effects become apparent a year later, and last for more 
than 2 years, which may be considered to be the consequence of teaching. This result is in line with 
the findings of Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (2012) and Ellinger and Keller (2003), who suggested that 
one of the basic activities of bosses is teaching, the effects of which can persist over time. Boss 
effects can last for a long period of time in employees’ careers due to the effects of skill transfer and 
good working habits learned from their bosses. 
The variation in lagged boss effects among bosses is still observed when the workers’ personal 
effects are controlled for in Estimations B0, B1, and B2, as seen in Table 2. This indicates that the 
variation in boss effects is not caused by the different characteristics of the workers themselves, but 
by the consequences of the personal management styles of previous bosses. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 1% significance level in Estimations B1 and B2 indicates that boss effects from 
previous bosses are heterogeneous. In other words, the heterogeneity of boss effects becomes 
apparent a year later and lasts for at least 2 years owing to the different management styles of bosses. 
The finding that current bosses do not have an impact on workers’ performance suggests that the 
impact of bosses through, for example, teaching may require considerable time. 
(place Table 2 here) 
 
5.2  How do Boss Effects Change? 
The analysis outlined above confirms that boss effects may vary from boss to boss, even during 
the same period. Therefore, we need to investigate the relationship between current boss effects and 
the lagged boss effects. How do boss effects change over time? In order to investigate changes in 
boss effects, we compare the p-values of the likelihood-ratio tests of all estimations, because the 
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p-values of likelihood-ratio tests indicate the strength of the restrictions. As can be seen in Table 26, 
the p-value for the likelihood-ratio test in Estimation B0 is the largest among Estimations B0–B2. 
This suggests that boss effects are becoming more significant over time, i.e., bosses are having a 
greater impact on their subordinates’ performance. This finding seems reasonable if the workers are 
supervised by the same bosses across different periods, because the bosses can reinforce their impact 
over a longer period. 
 
5.3  Robustness Check 
This study uses different samples to investigate the robustness of the results outlined above. In one 
sample, the workers switch bosses during the previous year, while in the other sample, the workers 
switch bosses from 2 years earlier. Table 3 shows the results. It is found that the null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% significance level in the sample in which the workers switch bosses during the 
previous year (Bd1) and at the 10% significance level in the sample in which the workers switch 
bosses from 2 years earlier (Bd2). These results indicate that boss effects vary from boss to boss 
regardless of whether the workers switch bosses; that is, the results confirming the existence and 
heterogeneity of boss effects are robust. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the lagged boss effects can last even when the worker switches bosses. 
That is, boss effects remain robust after eliminating the fixed optimistic evaluations under same pair 
of a supervisor and a subordinate. 
It can be seen from Table 2 that the p-value of the likelihood-ratio test in Estimation B0 is the 
largest among the three estimations B0–B2, while the p-values of the likelihood-ratio test in 
Estimations B1 and B2 are nearly the same. This result is in line with that for Estimations A0–A2 in 
Table 2. However, a slightly different result is shown in Table 3, where it can be seen that the p-value 
of the likelihood-ratio test in Estimation Bd1 is much smaller than that in Estimation Bd2. This 
indicates that the 1-year lagged boss effects are more significant than the 2-year lagged boss effects 
when the workers switch bosses. Because the workers have different bosses over a 2- or 3-year 
period, the bosses cannot maintain their impact. Hence, the boss effects are less significant over 
time. 
(place Table 3 here) 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
The primary objective of this study is to document the existence and heterogeneity of boss effects 
in a single Japanese company. We use an ordered probit model to analyse the pooled data and a panel 
ordered probit model to investigate the boss effects after controlling for personal effects. The 
                                                 
6 Because workers’ individual effects are controlled for in the panel ordered probit model, the results of the panel 
ordered probit model are more convincing than those of the ordered probit model. Therefore, we focus on the panel 
ordered probit model when comparing the p-values of the likelihood-ratio tests.  
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analysis results in two findings. First, it is found that previous bosses have a significant impact on 
their subordinates’ evaluation outcomes. Furthermore, these boss effects last for at least 2 years, 
because a part of these effects is the consequences of teaching. In other words, in the first year, 
bosses do not have a teaching or coaching effect. Along with the finding of former literature that 
examined 6- and 12-month lagged boss effects, this study demonstrated the boss effects lasting even 
longer term as proving the 2-year lagged boss effects. Second, there are significant variations in boss 
effects in the second year after a change of boss. This suggests that boss effects vary from boss to 
boss, because each boss has his or her own management style.  
These results have some implications for company management. Because the boss effects exist 
from the second year and last for at least for 2 years, it would seem better to focus on the training of 
bosses to improve their subordinates’ performance. Further to the findings of previous studies that 
examined six-month and 12-month lagged boss effects, this study demonstrated that the boss effects 
last for even longer periods of time, as proved by the 2-year lagged boss effects. This is mainly due 
to the bosses’ teaching activities. Therefore, those workers whom the company expects to promote to 
supervisory positions should have both sophisticated professional skills and excellent teaching skills. 
In addition, each boss has a unique way of supervising and training his or her subordinates. Hence, it 
is likely that boss effects will be improved by increasing communication among bosses such that 
they can share their experiences and learn from one another. Because coaching skills represent 
another important factor that has an effect on subordinates’ performance, boss effects will also be 
improved by training bosses in communication skills. Finally, it is better to focus not only on 
employees’ current bosses, but also on their previous ones. Furthermore, it is better if workers do not 
switch bosses frequently, such that the bosses have sufficient time to reinforce their impact on their 
subordinates. 
Although this study investigates the existence, heterogeneity, and trends of boss effects in both 
white-collar and technology-based jobs, there are several limitations in the analysis. It is difficult to 
discuss and compare boss effects in technical occupations with those in white-collar occupations 
such as those in the sales division, R&D division, and planning division, because the sample size of 
the data used in this paper is not large enough to be divided into two parts. Additionally, although the 
evaluation outcomes can capture not only the results of performance but also the workers’ attitudes 
during the process, the evaluation outcomes as a surrogate variable of performance may be limited 
by the evaluation distribution. As a result, the evaluation outcomes may reflect the relative 
performance results rather than the absolute ones. These limitations will be addressed in future 
studies.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of evaluation outcomes  
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Figure 2: Distribution of evaluation outcomes in each year 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent  Variable
Evaluation Evaluation outcome of the employee 2,016 3.76 0.74 1.0 5.0
Personal Characteristics
Age Age of the employee (at the time evaluated) 2,102 33.28 10.59 18.2 59.3
Age (squared) Squared value of age of the employee (at the time evaluated) 2,102 1219.66 803.52 330.0 3510.6
Gender Gender of the employee 2,283 0.26 0.44 0.0 2.0
Years of Schooling Schooling years of the employee 2,276 14.04 2.38 9.0 18.0
Working Environment
Evaluation_Peers Average evaluation outcomes of colleagues 2,229 3.75 0.34 2.0 5.0
Evaluation_Peers_lag1 Average evaluation outcomes of colleagues 1 year lagged 1,771 3.74 0.32 2.0 5.0
Evaluation_Peers_lag2 Average evaluation outcomes of colleagues 2 years lagged 1,333 3.72 0.33 2.5 5.0
Subsize Scale of the departement in which the employee works 2,102 24.83 22.76 1.0 76.0
Subsize_lag1 Scale of the departement in which the employee works 1 year lagged 1,918 24.64 21.62 1.0 76.0
Subsize_lag2 Scale of the departement in which the employee works 2 years lagged 1,499 24.36 20.99 1.0 76.0
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Table 2: Regressions of evaluations using the ordered probit model and the panel ordered probit model 
 
 
PANEL A: Orderd Probit Model PANEL B: Panel Orderd Probit Model
A0 A1 A2 B0 B1 B2
Variable Base-year data 1-year lagged data 2-year lagged data Base-year data 1-year lagged data 2-year lagged data
Age 0.129* 0.084* 0.128* 0.142* 0.084* 0.136*
-0.024 (0.028) (0.035) -0.031 (0.033) (0.045)
Age (squared) -0.002* -0.001* -0.002* -0.002* -0.001* -0.002*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.000) (0.001)
Gender -0.046 -0.124 -0.120 -0.088 -0.148 -0.165
(0.081) (0.092) (0.110) (0.106) (0.105) (0.139)
Years of Schooling -0.042** -0.017 -0.024 -0.043*** -0.015 -0.019
(0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.028)
Blue Collar Dummy　† 0.009 -0.099 -0.064 -0.041 -0.149 -0.161
(0.099) (0.108) (0.120) (0.119) (0.120) (0.148)
Peer Effect 1.818* 2.018*
(0.123) (0.130)
Peer Effect -1 -0.109 -0.172
(0.132) (0.137)
Peer Effect -2 0.240 -0.024
(0.182) (0.186)
Assessor Dummies yes yes
Assessor Dummies -1 yes yes
Assessor Dummies -2 yes yes
Year Dummies ‡ yes yes yes yes yes yes
Likelihood-ratio test for null hypothesis:                               
 Boss effects are equal to each other among bosses.  (θ2=θ3=…=θZ)
 (θ2=θ3=…=θZ)
LR chi2 statistic 45.11 78.29 82.23 22.63 76.66 72.69
Prob > chi2 0.232 0.000 0.000 0.983 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -1423.829 -1171.069 -816.224 -1422.509 -1171.386 -817.303
 Pseudo R2 0.133 0.0513 0.085
Observations 1,523 1,137 825 1,523 1,137 825
Number of id 403 367 352
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.1
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Table 3: Estimation using the sample in which workers have different bosses 
from the previous year (Panel Bd1) and from two years ago (Panel Bd2) 
 
 
 
 
　　　　　　　　
PANEL Bd
Panel Orderd Probit Model
Bd1 Bd2
Variable 1-year lagged data 2-year lagged data
Age 0.057 0.136*
(0.037) (0.050)
Age (squared) -0.001*** -0.002*
(0.000) (0.001)
Gender -0.182 -0.146
(0.114) (0.142)
Years of Schooling 0.012 -0.042
(0.024) (0.031)
Blue Collar Dummy　† -0.075 -0.226
(0.146) (0.164)
Peer Effect -1 -0.140
(0.179)
Peer Effect -2 0.417***
(0.219)
Assessor Dummies -1 yes
Assessor Dummies -2 yes
Year Dummies ‡ yes yes
Likelihood-ratio test for null hypothesis:                               
 Boss effects are equal to each other among bosses. 
 (θ2=θ3=…=θZ)
LR chi2 statistic 69.81 47.11
Prob > chi2 0.001 0.067
Log Likelihood -724.395 -545.589
Observations 708 463
Number of id 321 279
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.1
